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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of education on urban labour market participation and 
earnings in seven major West African cities. Our results show that although education does not always 
guard against unemployment, it does increase individual earnings in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, 
Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou and opens the door to get into the most profitable niches, 
which are found in the formal private and public sectors. We shed light on convex returns to education 
in all the cities considered. Besides, not controlling for the endogeneity of education leads to biased 
estimated returns (either upward or downward depending on the city) which stresses the complexity of 
the mechanisms linking education and earnings across cities and sectors. We also bring some support 
to the idea according to which social capital may largely be at work in this relationship. Finally, a 
major contribution of this paper is to provide evidence of significant effects of education on individual 
earnings in the informal sectors of the major WAEMU cities, even at high levels of schooling. 
Key Words: Returns to education, earnings, endogeneity, selectivity, informal sector, Sub-Saharan 
West Africa 
RESUME 
L'objectif de ce papier est d’étudier les effets de l’éducation sur la participation au marché du travail 
urbain et la rémunération du travail dans sept capitales d’Afrique de l’Ouest francophones. Nous 
montrons que si l’éducation ne constitue pas toujours un rempart contre le chômage, elle est un facteur 
incontestable d’accroissement des gains sur les marchés du travail d’Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, 
Dakar, Lomé, Niamey et Ouagadougou. Elle permet notamment aux individus les mieux dotés de 
s’insérer dans les créneaux les plus rentables à savoir les secteurs formels privé et public. Les 
rendements marginaux de l’éducation estimés sont convexes dans toutes les villes considérées. Nous 
montrons également que ne pas prendre en compte l’endogénéité supposée de la variable d’éducation 
dans les fonctions de gains conduit à surestimer ou à sous-estimer les rendements de l’éducation 
suivant les cas. Ce résultat rend compte de la complexité du lien entre éducation et revenus en fonction 
de la ville et du secteur d’affiliation des individus. De plus, nos estimations corroborent l’idée selon 
laquelle le capital social des travailleurs interférerait de façon significative dans ce mécanisme. 
Finalement, l’apport de notre étude est aussi de montrer que le capital éducatif, y compris à des 
niveaux élevés, permet un accroissement substantiel des gains dans le secteur informel de la plupart de 
ces grandes villes de l’UEMOA. 
Mots-clefs : Rendements de l’éducation, revenus, endogénéité, effet de sélection, secteur informel, 
Afrique de l’Ouest. 
JEL Code : J24, J31, O12 
                                                     
1 We would like to thank participants at the Cornell University/CREA Conference 2005 in Dakar, at the CSAE Conference 2006 in Oxford 
and at the IREDU/World Bank Conference 2006 in Dijon for helpful suggestions. Usual disclaimers apply. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At a time when all development policies are focused on poverty reduction, it is a paradox that the 
research community has not taken the full measure of the role that could be played by improving the 
way urban labour markets work in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This bias can partly be explained by the 
concentration of pockets of poverty in rural areas. And yet, in labour-abundant countries undergoing 
rapid urbanisation where, for the vast majority, the population – particularly the poor – earns its 
income from work, the creation of “decent work” in towns (to use the International Labour 
Organization’s terminology) is a major challenge for Africa’s future2. In SSA, education is often seen 
as the main policy instrument in the fight against poverty because it may help individuals access better 
jobs and thus raise their labour earnings. However, in practice, although the value of education is 
strongly reaffirmed as an intrinsic component of development and of the well-being of populations in 
SSA (through the Millennium Development Goals, the Education for All initiative, etc.), its economic 
efficiency, on the contrary, is more contested. 
The dilemma is that the ability to increase the demand for education depends greatly on the families’ 
opinion on how profitable it is on the labour market, i.e. its ability to provide attractive jobs. Yet, the 
results in the past few years are ambiguous in this respect. The idea of a widening education-job gap is 
widespread. Unemployment of qualified workers, worsened by the lasting freeze in civil service 
recruitment and the lack of vitality in the formal private sector, massive unemployment and an 
education system unsuited to the needs of the informal sector, and more generally the deterioration in 
the quality of public education under pressure from drastic budget restrictions, are all factors that tend 
to undermine the value of investment in schooling. Education no longer seems to guard against 
poverty and social exclusion in SSA. 
In this context, it is of key importance to be able to reappraise the external efficiency of education in 
SSA. We intend to do so in this paper by using the unique household 1-2-3 surveys on employment, 
the informal sector and poverty in the main agglomerations of seven French-speaking West African 
countries. The cross-sectional data sets gather a total of nearly 100,000 individuals surveyed between 
2001 and 2003.  
Traditional studies of the external efficiency of education systems look at the impact of the education 
received by individuals once they have left their school or training establishment to continue their 
lives as adults in society3. There are two types of impacts – economic in the narrowest sense and social 
in the wider perspective – and these can be interpreted either from the individual or the collective 
standpoint. This study focuses solely on the economic and private dimensions of the external 
efficiency of education. Analyses of the individual effects of education in the economic sphere often 
study the inter-individual earnings differentials, which were thought to result from wage 
compensations for workers’ different levels of human capital endowment. In this way, standard human 
capital theory has substantial implications for poor countries because it interprets income differences 
between individuals in the labour market. The Mincer earnings model derives directly from the 
theory’s assumption that individuals are paid based on their marginal productivity. This suggests that 
investment in education is an explanatory factor in the distribution of earnings. Under this assumption, 
a strong implication in terms of economic policy is that if inequalities in income distribution are to be 
reduced in a given country, the starting point is to reduce inequalities in access to schooling, given that 
income inequality seems to be higher when education is less equally distributed. 
                                                     
2 However, there has been some progress in awareness of the issue at the highest political levels, as shown by the extraordinary Summit of 
the African Union on employment and the fight against poverty, held in September 2004 in Ouagadougou, or the latest economic reports 
from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA, 2005) and the World Bank (2006), which deal precisely with these questions. 
3 By way of comparison, “analyses on the internal efficiency of education systems concern the school processes and the way the teaching 
establishments operate: generally speaking, they compare the schools’ activities and organizational methods with the results obtained by 
pupils whilst they are still in the system, looking for the most cost-effective situations.” (Mingat and Suchaut, 2000, p. 170). 
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Education policies can help reduce poverty by increasing the earned income of the most highly 
educated workers. It is therefore useful to know the returns to education for individuals with different 
living standards in different countries. If returns to education are high for individuals from poor 
families, poverty reduction policies designed to promote equal opportunities in access to schooling 
would be appropriate. However, numerous objections and criticisms have been made regarding the 
assumption that education - and hence productivity - are the only determinants of differences in 
individuals’ earnings. The first models were built for industrialised countries (mainly the United 
States). Yet many authors have demonstrated, particularly in an African context, that the traditional 
theories postulating the levelling of income levels between individuals with identical levels of human 
capital endowments do not fit when markets are imperfect or segmented. 
Markets in most African countries are not only imperfect, but the nature of work contracts also 
interferes significantly in the relationship between human capital endowments and earnings. In 
particular, it is widely acknowledged that there are four types of labour markets in developing 
countries, namely rural, public, private formal and informal. These markets each have their specific 
characteristics, such as job seasonality and uncertainty about the level of demand, the nature of 
contracts and the structure of wages and earnings (Adams, 1991; Ray, 1998; Hess and Ross, 1997; 
Schultz, 2004). 
However, many studies referring to the external efficiency of education in these countries (particularly 
on the questions of the match between training and employment or on the private returns to education) 
overlook the fact that the existence of different employment segments, especially in the rural and 
informal sectors, can have major implications as to the role of education in labour market integration. 
Vijverberg (1995) observes that some types of employment, such as self-employed work, cannot be 
linked to the individuals’ credentials, or to a pay scale of any sort, meaning that education can only 
play a minor role in explaining individual earnings levels. Bennell (1996) notes that many studies on 
developing countries are based on data for formal-sector employees and do not take into account 
income in rural and informal sectors where returns to education are probably very low. Glewwe (1996) 
also reveals that the wage structures in the private sector reflects the impact of education on the 
workers’ productivity more than they do in the public sector.  
Taking account of these African specificities, the aim of our study is to analyse the effects of 
education on urban labour market participation and labour remuneration in seven major West African 
cities of the WAEMU4 (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou). Based 
on the first-hand, recent and comparable 1-2-3 surveys in these seven capitals, we broaden the scope 
and refine the indicators generally used to assess the efficiency of education for labour market 
integration in SSA, using exactly the same method for each city. In particular, we estimate the 
determinants of earned income, especially the effect of education, whilst differentiating individuals 
according to the institutional sector to which they belong (public/formal private/informal private). 
Moreover, our data allow us to compare the returns to vocational versus general education at different 
levels of the schooling path which is one of the central aspects of education and vocational training 
literature i.e., the debate on whether it is general education or vocational training that has the highest 
returns. Finally, our household survey data enable us to address two persistent econometric problems 
when one wants to assess the causal impact of education on earnings. 
Firstly, we tackle the issue of the possible endogenous sample selectivity biases regarding paid-work 
participation and sector choices by using appropriate procedures5 when the first stage choice model 
has several modalities, namely enter the public, formal private or informal sectors versus non paid-
work participation. Although the effect of education on earnings differs depending on the employment 
sector and the type of job held, it is also a determinant of individual choices made upstream, i.e. when 
the decision is made to enter the labour market, and especially sector choices. Hence, it is widely 
                                                     
4 WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union. The survey was not carried out in Guinea-Bissau. 
5 See the discussions in Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2004). 
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recognised that observable individual characteristics (such as human capital in general), but also 
unobservable individual characteristics, influence both decisions to participate and the level of 
individual earnings. Secondly, our data allow us to address the issue of the possible endogeneity of the 
education variable in the earnings function using different alternative techniques that make use of 
family background information. In addition, we rely on household fixed effects regressions as our data 
are rich enough to observe several individuals in the same household. This is a way to fully control for 
the individuals’ family environment which may be viewed as their social capital. To our knowledge, 
this is the first time that such a comparative investigation of several African countries has been made 
based on surveys using identical sampling plans and questionnaires. Then, the comparative nature of 
our data gives our study a unique slant in that the effects of education can be studied in a uniform 
manner for all the countries. 
Our results show that although education does not always guard against unemployment, it does 
increase individual earnings and opens the door for the most well-educated to get into the most 
profitable niches, which are found in the formal private and public sectors. We also shed light on 
convex returns to education in all the cities considered. Furthermore, not controlling for the 
endogeneity of education leads to biased estimated returns (either upward or downward depending on 
the city) which stresses the complexity of the mechanisms linking education and earnings across cities 
and sectors. We also bring some support to the idea according to which social capital may largely be at 
work in this relationship. Finally, a major contribution of this paper is to provide evidence of 
significant effects of education on individual earnings in the informal sectors of the major WAEMU 
cities, even at high levels of schooling. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the data and survey design. 
Section 3 presents our methodology and the econometric models. Section 4 analyses and discusses the 
findings. Section 5 presents our conclusion. 
2. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 
Our data are taken from an original series of urban household surveys in West Africa, the 
1-2-3 Surveys conducted in seven major WAEMU cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, 
Niamey and Ouagadougou) from 2001 to 2002. The surveys were carried out by the relevant 
countries’ National Statistics Institutes (NSIs), AFRISTAT and DIAL as part of the PARSTAT 
Project6. 
The surveys cover the economic city, i.e. the “administrative city” and all the small towns and villages 
directly attached to it and with which there are frequent exchanges. As suggested by its name, the 1-2-
3 Survey is a three-phase survey. The first phase concerns individuals’ sociodemographic 
characteristics (including education and literacy) and labour market integration. The second phase 
covers the informal sector and its main productive characteristics. The third phase focuses on 
household consumption and living conditions. The same methodology and virtually identical 
questionnaires were used in each city, making for totally comparable indicators. 
Our study uses solely the Phase 1 data. Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 Survey is a statistical employment survey 
designed to: 
- Provide the main indicators to describe the situation of individuals and households on the labour 
market. It covers household employment and economic activities, especially in the informal 
sector; 
- Serve as a filter survey to identify a representative sample of informal production units, which 
are then surveyed in Phase 2. 
                                                     
6 Regional Statistical Assistance Programme for multilateral monitoring sponsored by the WAEMU Commission. 
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The following presents a brief description of the sampling plan, the content of the questionnaires and 
the handling of the tricky question of income, which plays a key role in this study. 
2.1. The sampling plan 
The detailed methodology is described in  Brilleau, Roubaud and Torelli (2004, 2005). The sampling 
plan chosen used the classic technique of two-stage area sampling. Primary and/or secondary 
stratification was conducted where possible. The primary sampling units were small area units: 
Enumeration Areas (Zones de Dénombrement), Census Districts (Districts de Recensement), segments 
or even Enumeration Sections (Sections d’Enumération), depending on the country. Each area unit 
contained an average of 200 households. In general, a full list of these units was available from the last 
population census. The survey periods were as follows: 2001 for Cotonou, Ouagadougou, Bamako and 
Lomé; and 2002 for Abidjan, Dakar and Niamey. 
Following a stratification of the primary units based on socio-economic criteria, 125 primary units 
were sampled with probabilities proportional to their size. An exhaustive enumeration of the 
households in the selected primary units was then conducted. Following a stratification of the 
secondary units where possible, systematic random sampling was applied to sample approximately 
20 households with equal probabilities in each primary unit.  
The theoretical household samples were made up of 2,500 households in each of the seven cities, with 
the exception of Cotonou where the number was able to be raised to 3,000. A full 17,841 households 
actually answered the questionnaire. This corresponds to 93,213 individuals and 69,565 people aged 
ten and over (which is the potential labour force) for whom an individual questionnaire was 
completed. Table 1 in Appendix describes the theoretical and actual samples obtained for each city. 
In general, sample size was much higher than that observed in most of the urban household surveys 
with the result that the findings are more reliable. The sampling strategy used meant that the standard 
estimator quality indicators could be rigorously calculated (see Brilleau, Roubaud and Torelli, 2005). 
2.1.1. The questionnaires 
The questionnaire was made up of two forms: a household section covering all the sociodemographic 
characteristics of each household member, housing conditions and the household’s durable goods; and 
an individual questionnaire for each individual aged ten or over. The individual questionnaire was 
made up of six modules designed to define each person’s labour market situation and therefore to 
measure, among other things, what is termed the “external” efficiency of education. For example, the 
following aspects can be studied: employment status (employed worker, unemployed, out of the 
labour force), the characteristics of the main job (job status, seniority, earnings, etc.) and of the 
employer businesses (institutional sector, line of business, size, etc.), the characteristics of the 
secondary job, and unemployment (length, type of job sought and mode). Also included were a certain 
number of career path elements (last job held and situation of the interviewee’s father when he was 
15 years old) and unearned income. 
Although no specific module was included on education, this field was covered by a series of 
questions put to each household member7 concerning: school attendance (current or past), the school 
level reached, the number of completed years of education, the qualifications obtained (differentiating 
between general and vocational education), the type of school attended in the last year of schooling 
(state, private denominational or private non-denominational), and the interviewee’s father’s level of 
education and work status. Summary statistics of the various variables at our disposable and used in 
                                                     
7 See Brilleau, Roubaud and Torelli (2005) for a detailed description of the questionnaires. 
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the econometric analysis are reported in Table 3. Section 4 provides detailed descriptive analysis of 
the variables of interest for the entire population aged 15 and over in each city.  
2.1.2. Constructing the income variable 
It is not easy to study earnings in an African urban environment since a large majority of workers 
work in the informal sector where there are no accounts or pay slips and individuals are naturally 
reticent to disclose their incomes (this is not specific to Africa). Two strategies were adopted for the 
1-2-3 Surveys to at least partially overcome these problems: 
- For non-wage earners (self-employed and employers), the interviewers were asked to help them 
reconstitute their earnings by recapping incomings and outgoings over a reference period to 
which the interviewee could relate. Following this exercise, non-wage earners’ incomes were 
translated into a monthly sum in the questionnaire; 
- The individuals who were unable or unwilling to disclose their exact earnings were asked to 
give a bracket, defined by multiples of the minimum wage in force.  
This strategy produced the results reported in Table 2 in Appendix. On average, nearly half of all 
employed workers (48%) declared a precise income figure and over one-third (36%) gave a bracket. 
Less than 6% of workers gave no information. For both the workers who refused to disclose their 
earnings and those who gave only income brackets, earnings were imputed by an econometric 
estimation based on an income equation. An income model was first of all estimated for the employed 
workers who disclosed their precise earnings based on the individuals’ characteristics. The 
explanatory variables for income are as follows: age, gender, schooling, socio-economic group, 
institutional sector, seniority, location, type of contract, number of hours worked, steady or irregular 
job, and type of payment. The values predicted from this model were imputed for all individuals who 
did not disclose their earnings and those who gave an income bracket. Random sampling was 
conducted for these latter individuals and the result added to the estimated income until the sum 
obtained came within the bracket declared by the interviewee. To test the sensitivity of our results to 
the use of estimated incomes, we also performed regressions on the sub-sample of individuals who 
declared precise incomes only. As our estimates were only marginally modified, and remained 
qualitatively unchanged as compared to estimates obtained from the full sample of individuals, we 
choose to pursue the following analysis using the full sample of individuals in order to avoid reducing 
drastically the sample sizes and therefore the precision of our estimates.  
Full summary statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis are reported in Table 3. 
3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Our methodological approach consists of estimating different models to evaluate the impact of 
education in its different forms (years of education, type of school attended i.e. general versus 
vocational, level reached, and qualifications obtained) on (i) the conditions for labour market 
integration (participation and sector choices) and (ii) earned income. Our surveys enable us to estimate 
Mincer-type earnings models taking account of the sample selection effects associated with the 
individuals’ participation and sector choices. In addition, our data allow us to address the issue of the 
possible endogeneity of the education variable in the earnings function using different alternative 
techniques that make use of family background information.  
3.1. Modelling the sector choice 
Let Sj be the different occupational situations (j = 0 to 3): S0 = no work, S1 = public sector, S2 = formal 
private sector, S3 = informal private sector. We can view Sj as a “response function” to a set of latent 
continue variables S*j which measures the propensities to have the occupational situations Sj.  
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For each individual i, let suppose that the propensity to have the occupational situation Sj is linearly 
linked to her(his) characteristics: S*ij =βj’Xi + εij  where Xi is a vector of observed individual 
characteristics (including education), βj  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and εij is a random 
error term. The probability of individual i participating in sector Sj is equal to the probability that the 
propensity function of sector Sj for that individual being greater than that associated with the other 
sectors: 
Prob(S*ij > S*ik) for k ≠ j; k = 0, 1, 2, 3 (1) 
By replacing S*ij and S*ik with their expression, we obtain: 
Prob(βj’Xi + εij > βk’Xi + εik ) = Prob(βj’Xi - βk’Xi > εik -εij) for k ≠ j; k = 0, 1, 2, 3 (2) 
The form of the participation equation will depend on the assumption adopted as regards the 
distribution of error terms. If we assume that the errors are independently and identically distributed 
with a Weibull distribution, then the difference between the errors follows a logistic distribution and 
the probability of individual i choosing sector sj is expressed by: 
Prob(Sij=sj)=exp(βj’Xi)/Σkexp(βk’Xi) with k ranging from 0 to 3.  (3) 
For the model to be identifiable, we posit by convention β0=0. The parameters of the estimates hence 
represent the effect of a given characteristic on the chances of being in a segment rather than not 
working8. A binary logit may also be deduced from the multinomial based on the assumption of two 
exclusive choices (k=0 or k=1). 
3.2. Earnings equations with selection bias correction 
Modelling the earnings functions follows on from the estimation of the sector choice equations and is 
therefore the next step. 
Let’s say, as above: 
S*ij =βj’Xi + εij  (4) 
and  
Yij= ζj’Zi + ηij (5) 
Yij denotes the income that individual i earns by working in sector j where j=1 (public sector), 
2 (formal sector) and 3 (informal sector). Zi is the vector of observable individual characteristics 
(including education), ζj is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ηij is an error term. The aim is 
then to estimate the coefficients ζj for each sector. Yj is only observed if sector j is chosen and, 
therefore, ηj and εj are not independent. In this case, the OLS estimator is potentially biased. 
One of the ways of correcting this bias is to add a correction term to the earnings equation using Lee’s 
method (1983). This technique is a generalisation of the Heckman (1979)’s two-stage procedure when 
the first-stage choice equation has several modalities. The generalised form of the inverse Mills ratio 
introduced into the earnings equation for each sector sub-sample yields consistent estimators and, in 
our case in particular, estimators of the effect of the education variable on the levels of individual 
earnings. However, this Lee correction method was questioned because it is based on strong 
restrictions regarding the joint distribution of error terms in the equations of interest (Dahl, 2002; 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand, 2004). Nevertheless, the alternative methods proposed by the 
previous authors were inconclusive in the case of our data. The Lee’s method always performed better 
                                                     
8 In our case, this category corresponds to the individuals who did not declare positive earnings for the reference month. 
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considering the small size of our sector sub-samples9. In this paper, we then use Lee’s correction 
method and Bourguignon et al. (2004)’s Stata program to estimate our models. 
Another potential problem is that the multinomial logit suffers from the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives assumption (IIA), which in most cases is questionable. However, based on Monte-Carlo 
simulations, Bourguignon et al. (2004) conclude that ”selection bias correction based on the 
multinomial logit model seems a reasonable alternative to multinomial normal models when the focus 
is on estimating an outcome over selected populations rather than on estimating the selection process 
itself. This seems even true when the IIA hypothesis is severely at odds”. Then, using a multinomial 
logit model would not bias our results in the second stage regression, which allows us to be confident 
regarding this choice. This technique will constitute our baseline model that we shall be able to 
improve in the following way to account for the possible endogeneity of education. 
3.3. Endogenous education 
It is widely recognised that using OLS to estimate the returns to education from cross-section data is 
potentially problematic. The standard concern in the literature is that education may be an endogenous 
variable, i.e. correlated with the residual of the earnings function due to unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. To address this issue, one commonly uses instrumental variables techniques (IV) which 
imply finding variables that are uncorrelated with the individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity but 
correlated with their education. The instrumentation is often based on households and demographic 
characteristics which are assumed uncorrelated to the error term of the earnings equation. These 
instruments, popular when using developing country data, may capture various genetic and 
environment influences (Sahn and Alderman, 1988). For example, Ashenfelter and Zimmerman 
(1997) use parental education, Butcher and Case (1994) exploit the presence of any sister within the 
family, and Card (1995) draws on geographic proximity to a four-year college as instruments.  
Treating the endogeneity of education with IV may lead to downward estimation of the returns to 
education if schooling is positively correlated with the individuals’ unobserved ability. For instance, 
Belzil and Hansen (2002) find a strong positive correlation between unobserved ability and 
unobserved taste for schooling, thus leading to substantial upward bias in the OLS estimates of the 
return to education. However, a more common finding in the empirical literature is that estimated 
returns rise as a result of treating education as an endogenous variable (see e.g. Card, 2001). In such 
case, OLS estimation suffers from the so-called attenuation bias caused by measurement errors in the 
reported years of schooling. Griliches (1997), Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994) suggest that the omitted ability biases in the OLS estimates are relatively small, but 
the downward bias due to measurement errors could be sizeable. Since there are potentially two effects 
playing in opposite directions (ability versus attenuation biases), an OLS estimate of the return to 
education can bias in either way, i.e. either overestimates or underestimates the true return, depending 
on the relative magnitudes of these biases (Li and Urmanbetova, 2002). 
In this paper, we tackle the issue of endogeneity using different alternative techniques. Firstly, father’s 
schooling and main occupation are used as instruments and we use a control function approach 
(Garen, 1984; Wooldridge, 2002; Söderbom et al., 2006). The method can be described in the 
following way. We first regress education (the number of years of completed schooling) on the set of 
instruments. Based on this regression, we estimate the residual λˆ . In the second stage, we estimate the 
earnings functions in which λˆ  is used as a ‘control variable’ for the unobserved heterogeneity 
component. This approach will produce consistent estimates of the parameters of interest provided 
standard conditions for identification hold, and provided the instruments are independent of λˆ  and 
                                                     
9 Indeed, based on Monte-Carlo simulations, Bourguignon et al. (2004) conclude that “Lee’s method is adapted to very small samples (…)”. 
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uncorrelated with the residual of the earnings function10. The control function method is adapted when 
the earnings-education profile is non-linear in the estimated parameters. Specifically, as discussed by 
Card (2001), the control function approach is more robust than 2SLS when slope parameters 
potentially co-vary with the unobserved factors of the model. In addition, even if all slope parameters 
are constant, 2SLS is likely to yield relative imprecise parameter estimates when the model is non-
linear in the endogenous variable, namely education in our case. As show our results, the control 
function approach is worthwhile in our case since the marginal effect of education on earnings is 
found to be non-constant, with a convex profile. This is the reason why we prefer the control function 
approach instead of the 2SLS. 
Secondly, following Blackburn and Neumark (1995) and Lam and Schoeni (1993), we directly 
introduce family background information (father’s education and occupational status) into the earnings 
functions by assuming it may act as a proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity component. This is 
another way to apply the control function procedure. Indeed, individual education could be deemed 
endogenous if, for instance, the father has contributed to job access for his child or if father’s 
education and/or work status are actually proxies for the individual’s unobserved ability. This would 
be the case if there exist “genetic transmission” of ability or if parents with a lot of education (or with 
particular jobs) can help their children develop skills that are subsequently rewarded in the labour 
market. Using IV estimates relies on the assumption that such situations do not arise and that parental 
education variables can be considered as valid instruments. However, it is unclear whether parental 
education/work status should be used as instruments or as proxies for the unobserved ability 
component. In this paper, we shall attempt to use this information in both ways in order to check the 
robustness of our results to these different assumptions. 
Lastly, our data allow us to rely on household fixed effects (HFE) regressions. This is a way to control 
for the individuals’ current family environment which may be viewed as their social capital. Indeed, in 
Africa, individuals’ social capital and networks are likely to strongly affect their access to 
employment, sector affiliation and, as a result, their reward of education. Moreover, if the current 
household features are correlated to individuals’ abilities, then introducing HFE in the regressions is 
another way to purge unobserved ability bias in the returns to schooling. In the following, we assume 
that these household effects may be added to the previous IV earnings equations rather than are an 
alternative to the techniques aimed at correcting the potential endogeneity of education. Indeed, while 
IV methods may correct the endogenous education due for instance to unobserved ability, the HFE 
may capture other aspects believed to influence earnings, but not necessarily education, namely access 
to information for better jobs, i.e. the so-called “networks effects”.  
All these different techniques are interesting to perform because the different assumptions behind 
them may lead to common features in the results that we shall be able to consider as relatively robust. 
Thus, even if endogeneity issues are not perfectly corrected, the similarity of results from the different 
methods should help convincing us of their relative soundness.  
In order to identify the HFE, we need to restrict our initial samples to sub-samples including at least 
two interviewed active occupied individuals in each household. On average, this reduces by 24% our 
initial samples of active individuals, i.e. those with positive earnings11. For the sake of comparison 
between the different alternative methods, we perform the other estimation techniques using the same 
restricted samples. These include, on the one hand, estimates stemming from simple OLS earnings 
functions (with no correction for endogenous sample selection), earnings functions using Lee’s 
correction for selectivity and assuming exogenous education and, on the other hand, Lee’s earnings 
functions with endogenous education including our different “controls” for unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                     
10 As is discussed in Söderbom et al. (2006), however, 2SLS does not require independence between the instruments and the unobserved 
component of the earnings equation – just zero covariance – unlike the control function approach. Thus, 2SLS is less restrictive than the 
control function. Nevertheless, with 2SLS, identification is likely to be harder to achieve in practice. Indeed, in the case of flexible forms 
of education variable (dummy variables for each level), the interest of the control function approach over 2SLS is that we only need to add 
a univariate function in the first stage, rather than instrumenting for several variables corresponding to the various education degrees. 
11 For instance, in so doing, we drop 14% of individuals in the Senegalese sample and 35% in the Nigerien sample. The other cities lie 
within this bracket.  
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(father’s education and occupation status and the control function approach). Finally, we use HFE in 
the control function regression. 
4. ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
Before reporting any result from the econometric analysis, it is useful to provide descriptive statistics 
of the main variables of interest. This examination is a necessary step if one wants a full picture of the 
incidence and external efficiency of education in the urban labour markets of the considered countries. 
We start by looking at the distribution of the stock of education in the seven cities. We then cast a 
glance at the efficiency of education in terms of exits from unemployment, integration into the 
different labour market segments (formal/informal). Results from the econometric analysis are then 
presented.  
4.1. Overview of the level of education in the seven cities  
4.1.1. Education remains a rare factor 
Across all generations, the accumulation of educational capital remains low in all seven cities: the 
average number of years of completed schooling is only about 5 years, and over half of the individuals 
aged 15 years or over (55%) either never attended school or attended school but did not complete 
primary cycle. Yet people are only considered to be literate as adults when they have completed 
primary school. On this basis, we estimate the proportion of literate individuals aged 15 and over in 
the WAEMU cities in the early 2000s at 45%. Moreover, these literate individuals’ level of education 
was extremely modest since nearly half of them did not go beyond the Secondary College (first four-
year cycle of secondary education), and less than a quarter completed the second secondary cycle 
(total of seven years of secondary education), with the possibility of enrolment in higher education. 
The distribution of individuals aged 15 and over by level of education in each of the cities taken 
separately is pyramid-shaped with a broad base and a very narrow summit. This is indicative of a high 
level of illiteracy (at least 44%) and high drop-out rates between and within the cycles. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Although the cities have a common curve, they also display differences. If we look at the base of the 
schooling pyramid, i.e. the individuals who did not start or complete primary school, Bamako, Niamey 
and Dakar are found to be the most disadvantaged from this point of view (Table 3 and Figure 1). 
Approximately 60% of the over-15s in these cities do not have the minimum level of schooling in 
terms of having completed primary school. Conversely, “only” 45% of the population lack this basic 
level in Cotonou and Lome. Ouagadougou and Abidjan are in intermediate positions with respectively 
56% and 51% of the population who did not start or complete primary school. Abidjan has the highest 
proportion (13%) of individuals at the top of the educational pyramid (secondary school completed or 
higher education), ahead of Cotonou (11%). The other cities post percentages ranging from 7% to 
8.5%. 
Possession of the minimum human capital (i.e. at least completed primary schooling) also varies 
markedly by two demographic identification variables namely generation and gender (statistics not 
shown). Women are largely disadvantaged by gender in that nearly two-thirds (64%) did not complete 
primary school (as opposed to 45% of men). This rate rises to 68% in Dakar, Niamey and Bamako. 
Even in the cities with the longest-standing and most developed schooling (Cotonou and Lome), 
women remain largely on the fringes: 59% did not complete primary school. 
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When studied by generation, more under-35s (48%) have the minimum level of schooling than their 
elders aged 35 to 44 (44%) and especially those aged 45 and over (34%). This configuration reflects 
the steady development of the education system in the African countries. Yet the schooling dynamic is 
not the same everywhere. At one end of the scale, there are the cities with a long tradition of 
schooling. At the other end of the spectrum are those where the development of schooling has been 
stepped up more recently. The first group comprises Lome, Abidjan and Cotonou where, even among 
the individuals aged 45 to 59, a not-inconsiderable proportion (at least 45%) has the minimum level of 
schooling. In the second group (Bamako, Niamey and, to a certain extent, Ouagadougou), over 60% of 
the over-35s do not have the minimum level of schooling. Dakar stands out for its stagnation (at 
around 60%) in the proportion of individuals without the minimum grounding in education across all 
generations (15 to 59 years old).  
However, the performance of the education systems over time is less negative. Despite more numerous 
age groups and an unfavourable economic context, the rate of schooling has increased constantly since 
the countries became independent. The Sahel countries are making up for their initial handicap, 
whereas in all the countries the gap between boys and girls is tending to decrease. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that this quantitative democratisation is offset by deterioration in the quality of teaching. 
A last point worth mentioning about the educational landscape of the major WAEMU cities is the low 
weight of vocational education, which never exceeds 2% of the over-15s with the notable exception of 
Mali where it comes to 6%. This is characteristic of an education system in which vocational training 
is left by the wayside. 
4.2. Labour market integration and unemployment 
The ILO defines as unemployed any person who has not worked in the week preceding the survey and 
who is actively seeking work. The 1-2-3 Surveys add a second definition to this strict notion of 
unemployment: a broader concept of unemployment that takes the ILO definition and adds in all those 
who are not actively seeking a job, but are prepared to work should the opportunity arise. This broader 
definition of unemployment raises the number of unemployed from 460,500 to 673,000 individuals for 
all the WAEMU cities together. We feel it better reflects the real situation on the African urban labour 
markets, which typically have low rates of wage earners (only 36% of employed workers in all the 
cities considered are salaried employees) and no operational institutions to register job seekers and 
help them to find a job. 
4.2.1. A mixed bag of correlations between unemployment and level of education 
Taking all the WAEMU cities together, the unemployment rate is the lowest (14.6%) among those 
individuals without the minimum level of schooling. It rises to 20%-21% for those with levels ranging 
from completed primary schooling to completed secondary schooling. It then drops slightly (19%) 
among those individuals who have completed at least one year of higher education. Lastly, the fact 
that human capital is thin on the ground does not appear to protect those who have it against 
unemployment. This is particularly true in Lome where unemployment increases strictly with the level 
of education (from 8% for those with no education to 23% for those with higher education). The trends 
are less linear in the other cities. In most cases, unemployment tends first to increase with the level of 
education, but then decrease with the completion of secondary school and entry into higher education 
studies. This is particularly the case in Cotonou, Dakar and Ouagadougou where higher education 
somewhat reduces the extent of unemployment. 
Findings from a logit of the probability of being unemployed12 controlling for individual and 
household characteristics such as age, gender, migratory status, marital status, household’s per capita 
                                                     
12 These findings are not presented to save space but are available on request from the authors. 
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income, how the individual is related to the head of household and the household’s dependency ratio, 
are similar to those of the descriptive analysis. Ceteris paribus, individuals without the minimum level 
of schooling appear to be less exposed to unemployment that those who have at least completed 
primary school, probably indicating lower job aspirations for the former. Lome shows a strong 
positive relation between unemployment and education. Cotonou and Abidjan also follow this trend. 
In the other cities, the link between unemployment and level of education takes the bell shape 
observed previously. The fact that investment in human capital does not always open the door to 
employment reflects the state of deterioration on the African urban labour markets. This deterioration 
is due to the failure (or absence) of urbanisation policies unable, for whatever reason, to set in motion 
a drive to create skilled jobs. It is also a consequence of the structural adjustment policies whose credo 
was, among other things, to reduce staff in the civil service. This explanation is all the more plausible 
in that among the individuals aged 45 to 59, who entered the labour market before the urban boom and 
before the full force of the structural adjustment plans was felt, higher education is synonymous with a 
low risk of unemployment across all the countries. 
Although being unemployed is an indicator of exclusion from the labour market, having a job does not 
always guard well against precariousness. In the following, we look at the link between education and 
the quality of the job held in addition to its impact on unemployment. 
4.3. The “qualitative” balance on the urban labour markets: the match between 
education and job  
A quantitative analysis of the balance on the labour markets reveals the existence of not-
inconsiderable unemployment against which human capital accumulation is no shield, especially 
among young people. An analysis of external efficiency should also consider the correspondence 
between level of education and job quality. Job quality is studied here in terms of the employment 
sector: public formal, private formal and informal. 
4.3.1. Close correspondence between level of education and institutional sector 
There is a very close link between level of education and employment sector. In all of the cities, 
virtually all of the employed workers (91%) who did not start or complete primary school work in the 
informal sector. Complete primary schooling brings the proportion in the informal sector down to 75% 
and the fact of having completed middle school further reduces it to 50%. Only 19% of the individuals 
who entered higher education work in the informal sector. Give or take a few fluctuations, this 
configuration holds for all the cities except Lomé. Although, in the Togolese capital, the formal sector 
clearly supplants the informal sector as the level of education rises, this trend is slower than in the 
other cities and a not-inconsiderable proportion (39%) of people with higher education work in the 
informal sector. However, it is worth noting that this city also displays a phenomenon whereby 95% of 
individuals who did not start or complete primary school work in the informal sector. Even when 
controlling for a certain number of factors (those described previously) using a multinomial logit 
model of sector participation (not shown but available on request from the authors), the link between 
level of education and employment sector barely changes, regardless of the city considered. 
Although the level of education plays an important role in access to the modern sector, the type of 
education also has an important effect. For example, only 37% of the individuals with vocational 
training13 work in the informal sectors as opposed to nearly 50% of their counterparts who reached an 
equivalent level in the secondary system (having completed at least middle school without reaching 
secondary school). When the cities are taken separately, vocational education is found to be a better 
instrument for integration into the modern sector than general education in Niamey, Dakar, Bamako, 
                                                     
13 Individuals who completed at least four years of vocational education and who therefore obtained at least the Occupational Proficiency 
Certificate (CAP). 
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Cotonou and Lome. Approximately 82% of the Nigerian capital’s workers with vocational training 
work in the formal sector, as opposed to 71% in Dakar and Bamako, 58% in Cotonou and 50% in 
Lomé. By way of comparison, the proportion of people who had completed general studies at middle 
school and worked in the formal sector stood at 68% in Niamey, 55% in Dakar, 41% in Bamako, 44% 
in Cotonou and 30% in Lome. However, in Abidjan and Ouagadougou, vocational education shows no 
advantage over general education in terms of the chances of entering the formal sector. 
4.4. The impact of education on earnings 
We now investigate the effect of education on inter-individual earnings differentials using the methods 
described in Section 3. First, let us note that the average monthly earned income for individuals aged 
15 and over in the WAEMU cities is 63,000 CFA francs (96 euros in 2006)14. There are some 
substantial differences between cities (see Table 3). A worker in Abidjan earns an average 
78,000 CFA francs (119 euros) per month whereas a worker in Dakar earns 67,000 CFA francs 
(102 euros) per month and a worker in Lome earns a mere 35,000 CFA francs (53 euros) per month. 
The other cities are in intermediate positions with earned incomes of 49,000 to 59,000 CFA francs.  
At this aggregate level, there appears to be no clear link between the level of earnings and the level of 
human capital as measured by education. For example, Lome paradoxically posts the lowest average 
earnings and the highest average number of years of education. Conversely, workers are much better 
paid in Abidjan and Dakar where average levels of education are lower than in Lomé. However, there 
is a very close link at the individual level between level of education and earned income. For instance, 
across all the cities, incomes range from 39,000 CFA francs for those lacking minimum basic 
knowledge (not up to standard or incomplete primary schooling) to 122,000 CFA francs for those who 
completed second secondary cycle. Entry into higher education prompts a huge quantitative leap with 
earnings virtually doubling (from 122,000 to 228,000 CFA francs, i.e. 186 to 348 euros). Taken 
separately, each city follows this same earned income curve: steady growth through to the end of 
secondary school followed by a surge at higher education level.  
Breakdown by sector also reveals substantial earnings inequalities. For example, public-sector workers 
earn an average of 145,000 CFA francs (221 euros) per month, which is approximately three and a 
half times more than informal sector workers who scrape by with just 40,000 CFA francs (61 euros) 
per month. Formal private sector workers are also winners on the labour market with 
122,000 CFA francs per month. This bipolar configuration is found in all the cities studied: high 
earnings in the public sector, followed closely by the formal private sector (except in Abidjan where 
public-sector earnings are far higher – one and a half time – than that of the formal private sector), 
while the informal sector lags far behind these high yields. 
4.4.1. Returns to exogenous education  
The descriptive analyses above show the huge variability in earned incomes in the major West African 
cities: variability by city, level of education and employment sector. Yet although these analyses find a 
close link between investment in education and earnings, it is hard and tricky to deduce the intrinsic 
efficiency of investment in human capital on the labour markets considered. Isolating this efficiency 
entails first controlling for a certain number of factors that could affect remuneration. In the earnings 
regressions, we account for the individuals’ migratory status, marital status, religion, job seniority, 
potential experience, gender and employment sector. Moreover, a not-inconsiderable proportion 
(approximately 40% in all the cities) of the potentially working population aged 15 and over is either 
out of the labour force or unemployed.  Although this decision to not work is not random, any estimate 
of returns to education not taking into account non-participation is potentially biased.  
                                                     
14 Income in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Dakar’s PPP factor was taken as the reference.  
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In this section, we report the results obtained using the selection-correction models using the methods 
advocated in Section 3 on the seven (unrestricted) samples of the WAEMU cities. In these estimates, 
education is assumed exogenous but we will relax this assumption later on. The estimates are 
performed using the log of hourly rather than monthly earnings to take account of the heterogeneity of 
working hours in different sectors. In addition, the probable segmentation of the labour market calls 
for an estimation of models by employment sector. The findings of all these exercises are presented in 
Tables 4 to 8 in the Appendix. 
Whichever city is considered, we find a non-constant rate of returns to education in each city, the 
quadratic term of education being always significant and positive at the 1% level15. These convex 
marginal returns mean that education has a growing impact on remunerations in the urban labour 
markets. In Figure 2, we represent the evolution of the predicted earnings according to the years of 
completed schooling. We observe that the predicted earnings are relatively constant until the 8th year 
of education, and sharply increase after the 12th year of schooling indicating that the convex profile is, 
to a large extent, due to the surge of income observed when individuals make the transition from 
secondary to higher education. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
This result goes against the traditional model of human capital accumulation whereby the marginal 
return to education is assumed to be constant or even decreasing. This convexity has already been 
observed by Söderbom et al. (2006) on samples of employees in manufacturing firms in English-
speaking Africa (Kenya and Tanzania) but never, to our knowledge, on representative samples of 
urban areas in Africa. This result is important because the idea that primary education is an effective 
instrument to fight against poverty is based partly on the hypothesis of a concave earnings function, 
which states that education is more profitable for the first years of schooling. Recommendations for 
policies aimed at promoting primary education in Sub-Saharan Africa were drawn up on the basis of 
this premise (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002).  
The non-linear nature of the relationship between years of education and remuneration means that it is 
impossible to estimate a single marginal return. Instead, we have to estimate an average marginal 
return, i.e., for instance, a marginal return corresponding to the average number of years of education. 
This estimate finds that Ouagadougou has the highest returns to education, at nearly 10.3%. Next in 
line are Lome (8.5%), Niamey and Abidjan (8%), Cotonou (7.8%) and Dakar (7.2%). At the bottom of 
the scale, the average return in Bamako is just 6%.  
In addition, our estimates confirm a certain number of findings noted by other studies. For example, 
women in all the cities earn, other things being equal, from 29% (in Niamey) to 48% (in Bamako) less 
than men. Likewise, the informal sector pays a lot less than the formal private sector16, which pays 
slightly less than the public sector17. Finally, the selection-correction terms stemming from a probit 
equation of paid-work participation in the first stage are significant in the cases of Cotonou, Abidjan 
and Bamako only (at the 1% level, with negative signs for the formers and a positive effect for the 
latter). For these cities, this means that the mechanism of allocation in the two groups (paid-work 
participants versus non-participants) is not random and affects earnings significantly. In the case of 
Mali, paid-work participation is associated with unobserved characteristics that are positively 
correlated to earnings. Be sample selectivity not accounted for, OLS estimates would then yield biased 
estimates of the returns to schooling. We return to this point later. 
                                                     
15 We instigated whether our findings are sensitive to functional form by considering the effects of modelling the earnings-education profile 
as a third-order polynomial (i.e. a cubic) instead of a quadratic form. The results are not shown and available on request. The squared and 
cubed education effects are jointly insignificant at the 10% level in three cases (Benin, Senegal and Togo) out of seven. We therefore 
preferred to use a quadratic form in order to preserve the comparability across cities and to save on degrees of freedom. 
16 The difference between private formal and informal sectors range from 23% in Bamako to 62% in Ouagadougou. 
17 With deviations varying from some 3% in Bamako and Niamey to about 20% in Abidjan and Lome. 
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By estimating the magnitude of the returns to schooling using pooled samples including male and 
female individuals aged 15 and over, we rely on two important, and potentially restrictive, 
assumptions. Firstly, by pooling the data across genders, we constraint the returns to labour market 
characteristics to be identical for males and females. This might be a problem as women often have 
less continuous work participation than men and, as a result, may value their human capital differently 
on the labour market. However, as we correct for sample selection in work participation, this problem 
is probably not too severe since in so doing we tackle, though partially, the gender selectivity issues 
related to work participation18. Still, it is interesting to check whether the rewards for human capital, in 
particular for education, differ across genders. We then perform separate regressions for males and 
females (the estimates are not shown and available on request). Our results show that the returns to 
schooling are generally higher for men except in Abidjan where they are equal for males and females. 
The highest gap is found in Lome where men benefit from 10.6% versus 6.2% for women. More often, 
however, these differences are less than two percentage points (in Niamey, Bamako and 
Ouagadougou) and are statistically insignificant at the usual confidence interval. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Secondly, considering young and old individuals in the same regressions, or more generally 
individuals belonging to different age cohorts, is potentially problematic if these two categories 
receive different rewards for their observed work characteristics due to differentiated labour market 
conditions at the time they got their job. Pooling these individuals implies that there is no generation 
effect in the return to human capital. As this assumption does not necessarily hold, we relax it by 
estimating earnings functions with crossed age effects. In Table 5, we introduce into the previous 
earnings functions the same covariates crossed with a dummy indicating whether the individual is 
above 30 years old (old). If the set of estimates associated with the crossed variables is significantly 
different from zero, this means that one must reject the assumption of equal rewards of individual 
characteristics for young and “old” workers. Since we are more specifically interested in the return to 
education, we perform a F-test of joint significance of the linear and squared crossed education-age 
coefficients. The results are reported at the bottom of Table 5. They indicate that generation effects are 
not significant when looking at the returns to education in three cases (Cotonou, Niamey and Lome). 
In the four other cases (Ouagadougou, Abidjan, Bamako and Dakar), there are significant differences 
in the earnings-education profiles across the two cohorts since we can reject at the 1% level the 
hypothesis that the crossed education effects are jointly zero. If we compute the returns at the sample 
mean of education in the four abovementioned cases, we observe that the rewards are higher for young 
individuals in the cases of Ouagadougou and Dakar (respectively, 11.3% versus 9.5% and 9% versus 
6.5%) while this is the opposite in Abidjan (6.3% versus 8.7%). However, Bamako exhibits no 
important differences at the sample mean (5.4% versus 5.9%). More specifically, in the cases of 
Bamako, Ouagadougou and Abidjan, the significant negative signs on the coefficients of the crossed 
squared education term indicate that the convex earnings-education profile previously observed is 
more acute for young workers than for their elder counterparts. Hence, in Bamako, the significant 
difference in the marginal returns to education across cohorts stems from differentiated rewards at 
higher levels of schooling. 
The use of a single model to all gainfully employed individuals can only observe the average effect of 
education on earnings owing to specific effects found in each employment sector. In the case in which 
these specific effects differ little from one sector to the next (i.e. education acts in the same way in the 
informal, formal private and public sectors), an overall model suffices to be able to draw conclusions 
applicable to each of the labour market segments. Where these effects vary a great deal, it is also 
                                                     
18 A fair option would have been to work on the samples of men only. However, when looking at the results, this seems to us to be 
exaggerating the impact on the qualitative aspect of our study that produces considering both genders in the regressions. Besides, this 
option would lead to drastically reduce the sample sizes (by half) and, as a result, the precision and representativeness of the estimates by 
sector since women tend to work massively in the informal sector (86% of active women). 
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essential to estimate the returns to education separately for each sector. These estimates corrected for 
potential selectivity bias using Lee’s method are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 819.  
Insert Tables 6, 7 and 8 about here 
As expected, the models' explanatory power goes in descending order from public employment, to 
private employment, then to informal employment, with R2 decreasing on average from 0.47, 0.37 to 
0.25 respectively for each of the three sectors. This hierarchy is consistent with the predictions of the 
standard human capital model, as this is better suited to accounting for the heterogeneity of earnings in 
the public sector where wages are based on a set scale that takes these criteria (education, experience) 
explicitly into account. On the other hand, in the informal sector, apart from the probability of greater 
measurement errors, other factors not taken into account in our equation, such as the amount of 
capital, are likely to have a significant impact on earnings. 
Chow tests for the joint equality of coefficients across sectors show that the decomposition by 
institutional sector is justified. Indeed, we find highly contrasting configurations. First, in the informal 
sectors of most cities (except that of Bamako and Niamey), the selectivity correction terms are 
significant and negative at the 1% level indicating that informal sector participation is associated with 
unobserved characteristics that are negatively correlated to earnings differentials. This effect is less 
clear, however, in the formal private sector and even more in the public sector which highlights a 
higher heterogeneity of the selectivity effects across cities (either negative or positive, and significant 
in only two cases out of seven). 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
To synthesize the results for education, Figure 3 represents histograms of the marginal returns to 
education by sector and city. In five cities out of seven, the estimates show that the public sector is the 
sector in which education is given the most value, with a marginal return (at the sample mean of 
education) of between 9.6% (in Dakar) and 13.8% (in Lome). This reflects, to a great extent, the salary 
scales for civil servants, which are determined according to diploma and length of service. The 
modern private sector comes next (except in Niamey and Lome where it is the most rewarding) and, 
finally, the informal sector, with the exception of the capital of Burkina Faso where the informal sector 
seems to give more value to the benefits of schooling than the formal private sector (7.4% versus 
6.6%). As is claimed in Söderbom et al. (2006), in the public sector, earnings are determined by a 
number of factors orthogonal to productive ability and so the returns to education have a different 
interpretation in this sector than in the private ones. 
We also performed sectoral earnings functions with crossed age effects as in Table 5 (these are not 
shown and available upon request). Table 9 provides an overview of the returns obtained. We find that 
while the returns are always higher for old workers in the formal private sector (except in the case of 
Bamako), education is often given more value in the informal sector for the youngest (with the 
exceptions of Abidjan and Bamako). In the public sector, however, there is less clear pattern and the 
differences are never statistically significant20. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
4.4.2. Returns to endogenous education  
Following the methods described in section 3, we now turn to additional results tackling the potential 
problem of endogeneity of education in the earnings function. In what follows, we should interpret the 
estimates as robustness checks of the returns to schooling presented previously, and not as 
                                                     
19 We drop the tenure variable from the set of covariates in the sectoral estimates as seniority in the current job makes less sense in the 
informal sector.  
20 Note however that some sub-sample sizes of age groups invite us to consider the results with cautious.  
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representative ones, since we make use of restricted samples which are now unrepresentative of the 
main WAEMU cities. However, specific tests of equality of the mean characteristics between the 
restricted and unrestricted samples allow us to assume that the conclusions we may draw from the 
estimates using the restricted samples could well be generalised to the entire populations of paid-work 
participants21. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
The marginal returns to education obtained using the different alternative estimation techniques for the 
three sectors are reported in Table 10. Let us first note that correcting for selectivity effects using 
Lee’s approach refines the estimated returns to education as compared to estimates obtained using 
simple OLS. The correction is even more important in the public sector where the marginal return to 
education tends to decrease once endogenous sample selectivity is accounted for (with the exception 
of Dakar).  Compared to selectivity corrected returns, introducing the father’s characteristics (three 
dummies for his level of education and three dummies for his work status i.e. self-employed, 
unqualified wage-employee, and executive or manager), we observe that the returns to education are 
essentially unchanged. In fact, the father’s characteristics are never statistically significant in the 
earnings functions (with the exception of earnings in the formal private sector in Lome and in the 
public sector in Dakar). Therefore, such results cast doubt on the validity of using the father’s 
characteristics as proxies for the ability of his child. The father’s characteristics may be better used as 
instruments. For this reason, we proceed to use the father’s characteristics as instruments to correct for 
the omitted heterogeneity bias employing the control function (CF) method described in section 3. 
Based on the first stage regressions where education is regressed on all exogenous variables, we test 
for the joint significance of the coefficients on father’s characteristics. For all the specifications, we 
can reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly zero. From the CF estimates of the returns 
to schooling, several interesting patterns emerge. 
First, in 15 cases out of 21 (three sectors for seven cities), the results suggest that treating education as 
an endogenous variable increases the estimated returns. This finding is even more true in the public 
and in the informal sector where, with the exceptions of the public sector in Ouagadougou and Niamey 
and the informal sector in Abidjan, the returns to schooling are systematically enhanced once 
endogeneity is accounted for. This may be explained by the fact that estimation techniques treating 
education as exogenous suffer from the so-called attenuation bias caused by measurement errors in the 
reported years of schooling. However, in the formal private sector, this pattern is less clear since in 
Abidjan, Niamey and Lome, the returns decrease as a result of controlling for endogeneity of 
education. In such cases (together with the public sector of Niamey and the informal sector in 
Abidjan), we would be in presence of positive correlations between schooling and the individuals’ 
unobserved ability. Finally, to summarise, the findings from the CF estimates is in favour of the 
hypothesis of endogeneity of education, which never seems to be firmly rejected by the data22.  
Lastly, we add the household fixed effects (HFE) to the control function regressions. Our purpose is to 
fully capture other aspects believed to influence earnings, namely access to information for better jobs 
or the so-called networks effects (see section 3). In so doing, the problem is that we reduce the number 
of degrees of freedom in the models, especially in the cases of the public and private sectors where the 
sample sizes are small. This may explain why the significance of the different returns is severely 
reduced. This means that we should interpret these results with cautious, especially those of the public 
and private sector estimates. What the results highlight, however, is that accounting for household 
                                                     
21 We performed Hotelling's T-squared test of whether the set of means of the overall individual characteristics is equal between the 
restricted and unrestricted samples. These tests always reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis that the characteristics are equal. 
However, when looking at specific tests for the variables of interest (education and earnings) the conclusions are less definite. Tests of 
equality of the means of hourly earnings between the restricted and unrestricted samples show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
equality at the 10% level in five cases (Cotonou, Abidjan, Bamako, Lome and Niamey). As for education, the tests cannot reject the null 
in three cases (Abidjan, Bamako and Niamey) but the difference for the other cities is very small (always less than a year). Finally, if the 
restricted and unrestricted samples cannot be considered as similar in terms of individual characteristics, the specific tests on the main 
variables of interest are somehow reassuring in that there is no – or only a weak – difference in education and earnings between 
individuals in the restricted and unrestricted samples.  
22 The only exception might be the case of the public sector in Ouagadougou.  
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heterogeneity is essential when estimating the returns to schooling23. For instance, in the informal 
sector, where the estimates are the most robust due to the large sample sizes, we find that the returns to 
education are quite systematically modified (but not always in the same direction). This important 
result supports the idea according to which social capital may largely be at work in the relationship 
between education and labour market outcomes in the urban labour markets of these African countries.  
4.4.3. Returns to qualifications 
The fact that the earnings function is convex prompted us to make more detailed analyses, measuring 
the returns to different levels of instruction and not just to an average rate. To do so, we estimate the 
marginal returns to holding a diploma, thus accounting for the quality of the school career and the 
potential filter effects that might be attached to obtaining a diploma (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973). 
Besides, taking account of the previous results, we control for the endogeneity of education using the 
CF method (on the unrestricted samples) which is well adapted when the earnings-education profile is 
non-linear in the estimated parameters. 
Returns to qualifications can be studied in at least two ways. One way is to directly consider the 
regression model coefficients. In this case, the coefficient associated with each qualification dummy is 
interpreted as the rate of increase in earnings between individuals with no qualifications (the reference 
in the regressions) and individuals with the qualification considered. Another way is to calculate the 
marginal returns obtained by subtracting from the considered qualification’s coefficient 
(qualification d) the value of the coefficient for the qualification immediately below it 
(qualification d-1). For example, the marginal returns to a baccalauréat plus two years of higher 
education (BAC+2) are calculated by finding the difference between the coefficient for the BAC+2 
and the coefficient for just the baccalauréat alone. The returns to a primary certificate (CEP) are 
calculated as the difference compared to the “no diploma” category, that of the middle school 
certificate (BEPC) compared to the CEP, that of the BAC compared to the BEPC, etc. The marginal 
returns hence correspond to the increases in earnings generated by the acquisition of the successive 
qualifications. In this paper, we choose to interpret the marginal returns since they measure the 
additional value of each qualification rather than the value compared with “no qualifications”, which 
can almost always only ever be positive. 
Insert Figures 4, 5 and 6 about here 
The various sectoral earnings functions are not presented to save space but are available upon 
request24. Instead, we report histograms of the marginal returns to the various qualifications for each 
sector in Figure 4 to 7. Not surprisingly, the effect of each qualification on remuneration is positive 
overall with a huge quantitative leap for higher education, as already shown by the descriptive 
analyses. The most striking result is that, depending on the capitals, a certain number of diplomas do 
not have positive intrinsic marginal returns. This situation either reflects the inadequacy of the training 
considered with respect to the labour market, or the fact that certain diplomas do not in fact target the 
labour market but are solely aimed at giving access to higher levels of education. Although the latter 
hypothesis can be put forward to explain the low marginal profitability of a few diplomas in the public 
sectors of the seven capitals (like the short higher education courses in Bamako, Niamey, 
Ouagadougou, and Dakar, Figure 4), the fact that for a large number of diplomas additional earnings 
are nil or negative in the formal private sector (Figure 5) suggests, as we stressed in the introduction, 
that many of the training schemes set up by the State do not correspond to the needs of the labour 
market in this sector. 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
                                                     
23 F-tests of the joint significance of the HFE all reject the hypothesis of joint nullity at the 1% level. 
24 We neglect the potential generation effects in the regressions for the sake of simplicity. 
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None of the capitals escapes from this lack of connection between the level of training revealed by the 
diploma and the remuneration obtained on the formal private labour market. In the informal sector 
(Figure 6), the marginal earnings seem to be more coherent with the level of training acquired than in 
the formal private sector (but less than in the public sector). This result goes against the idea that the 
informal sector does not enhance the value of educational capital. Furthermore, the profitability of 
education in the informal sector is illustrated in a spectacular way by the income bonus received by 
individuals when they have a vocational diploma (in particular the BEP, Figure 7), in a sector where 
the returns to vocational training very often exceed those that the same diploma can procure in the 
formal private sector. Moreover, vocational education qualifications are often found to be more 
profitable than general education qualifications when compared with the number of years required to 
obtain them. For example, although it generally takes one year less to obtain the vocational certificate 
(BEP) than to obtain the baccalauréat, the BEP seems to be as profitable as the baccalaureate in all the 
cities (some differences of returns being insignificant at 10%, results not shown). The returns to the 
BEP are even found to be significantly over 30% higher than the returns to the baccalauréat in the 
formal private sector of Cotonou, and in the informal sectors of Bamako and Lome. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to study the effects of education on urban labour market participation 
and earnings in seven major cities of the WAEMU (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, 
Niamey and Ouagadougou). Based on the unique and comparable 1-2-3 surveys in these seven 
capitals, we find that although education does not always guard against unemployment, it does 
increase individual earnings in these labour markets by opening the door for the most well-educated to 
get into the most profitable niches, which are found in the formal private and public sectors. Apart 
from this relatively predictable result, our analyses helped refine the indicators generally used in SSA 
to assess the efficiency of education for labour market integration and highlight the complexity of the 
mechanisms involved in enhancing the value of education in the urban labour markets of SSA.  
Whereas traditional theories assume constant or concave marginal returns to education, which ensure 
immediate, high profitability from the first years of schooling, the data from the 1-2-3 surveys helped 
bring to light convex returns to education. In the cases of Bamako, Ouagadougou and Abidjan, the 
convex earnings-education profile observed is more acute for young workers than for their elder 
counterparts. These results mean that stimulating access to primary education is only effective in 
reducing poverty if the individuals concerned by this type of initiative can continue their studies in 
order to take full advantage of the high marginal returns related with long studies. However, this poses 
the delicate question of managing the flows of students leaving the general secondary and higher 
education cycles, which could certainly benefit from an in-depth review on the (too) general content of 
the schooling programmes, in order to readapt them to the labour market demands. 
Our study tackles two recurrent econometric issues when one wants to assess the effect of education 
on individual earnings. First, we find that endogenous sample selectivity related to informal sector 
participation is, in most cities, associated with unobserved characteristics that are negatively correlated 
to earnings differentials. This effect is less clear, however, in the formal private sector and even more 
in the public sector which emphasize a higher variability of the selectivity effects across cities. 
Second, in most cities, the assumption of exogeneity of the education variable can be rejected, and our 
results cast doubt on the validity of using the father’s characteristics as proxies for the ability of his 
child. Using a control function approach instead, with father’s education and work status as 
instruments, we find that the returns to schooling are often enhanced. This effect is particularly true in 
the public and informal sectors but its magnitude depends on the city considered. Not controlling for 
the endogenous education may also lead to upward-biased estimates of the returns to schooling in 
some cities which, to sum up, sheds light on the complexity of the mechanisms linking education and 
earnings across cities and sector affiliation. Moreover, making use of household fixed effects 
regressions, we bring some support to the idea according to which social capital may largely be at 
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work in the relationship between education and labour market outcomes in the urban labour markets of 
these African countries.  
Finally, a major contribution made by this study is to have shown that educational capital, even at high 
levels, provides a substantial growth in earnings in the informal sector in most of the cities studied25. 
This result has strong political implications: in African towns, there is currently an explosion in the 
numbers of highly qualified young people who are unable to find jobs to fit their skills in the formal 
sectors. If their schooling helps them, in the informal sector, to be more productive (probably thanks to 
innovation and adaptability) than their counterparts who have little or no education, the household and 
government investments made for their education are not in vain. Given that the informal sector has 
created over 80% of urban jobs in West Africa in recent years (Brilleau et al., 2005), concentrating 
public investments in employment in this sector with really attractive policies for the most qualified 
people could be, at least in the short term, a serious alternative to the lack of employment observed in 
the formal public and private sectors. Such a policy, coupled with continued support to primary and 
post-primary education, could also pay off in the medium to long term by generating the accumulation 
required for the modern economy to take off in the African cities. 
                                                     
25 Of course, the informal sector’s heterogeneity in this respect deserves consideration, notably the possible co-existence of different 
employment segments within the informal activity with own specific features. We leave this for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: PARSTAT Survey Sampling 
 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, Phase 1 (Employment), 2001-2002, National Institutes of Statistics, AFRISTAT, DIAL. 
Table 2: Method of Declaring the Variable Relating to Income from the Main Job (%) 
 
 Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lome Total 
Detailed income 51.2 42.5 53.2 54.3 42.1 38.3 55.0 48.1 
Income bracket 32.3 44.4 34.1 35.2 32.9 41.5 31.2 36.2 
Unpaid worker 14.6 7 9.8 4.1 11.5 11.6 12.3 10.3 
Income not disclosed 2.0 6.1 2.9 6.4 13.4 8.7 1.5 5.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Figure 1: Distribution of Individuals Aged 15 and Over by Education Level and City 
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Source: 1-2-3 surveys, Phase 1 (Employment), 2001-2002, National Institutes of Statistics, AFRISTAT, DIAL; authors’ calculations. * Did 
not reach the last year of that level of schooling. 
 Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lome Total 
Total number of primary 
units 464 713 2,483 993 368 2,041 129 7,191 
Number of primary units in 
the sample 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 875 
Initial number of households 
in the sample 3,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 18,000 
Final number of households 
in the sample 3,001 2,458 2,494 2,409 2,500 2,479 2,500 17,841 
Number of individuals in the 
sample (inc. visitors) 11,574 13,756 11,352 13,002 14,557 19,065 9,907 93,213 
Number of individuals aged 
ten and over in the sample 8,967 10,295 8,682 9,061 10,141 14,871 7,548 69,565 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Samples of Paid-Work Participants  
 
 
 
Cotonou  
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey 
(Niger) 
Dakar  
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
Observations 
(individuals with positive earnings) 4398 4211 4262 4032 3601 5434 3916 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
                
Hourly earnings in PPA 0.29 0.47 0.29 0.71 0.49 0.98 0.36 1.00 0.36 0.90 0.44 1.11 0.22 0.47 
Log hourly earnings in public sector -0.77 0.81 -0.70 0.77 0.00 0.72 -0.66 0.74 -0.75 0.81 -0.42 0.74 -0.96 0.89 
Log hourly earnings in formal private  -1.17 0.82 -1.01 0.92 -0.72 0.96 -1.23 1.09 -1.13 1.09 -0.89 0.89 -1.40 1.04 
Log hourly earnings in informal sec. -2.04 0.93 -2.36 1.01 -1.81 0.97 -1.95 1.05 -2.03 0.98 -1.75 0.96 -2.40 0.99 
Dummy for woman 0.52  0.41  0.44  0.44  0.36  0.43  0.52  
Age in years 35.92 11.58 34.98 12.23 33.32 10.69 35.00 12.44 36.90 12.26 35.08 12.44 33.89 11.01 
Dummy for above 30 years old 0.61  0.58  0.53  0.59  0.66  0.57  0.56  
Dummy for being native 0.45  0.41  0.28  0.43  0.36  0.58  0.40  
Dummy for urban migrant  0.27  0.36  0.43  0.31  0.28  0.25  0.35  
Dummy for rural migrant  0.19  0.12  0.07  0.18  0.25  0.11  0.12  
Dummy for foreign migrant  0.10  0.10  0.21  0.07  0.10  0.03  0.14  
Dummy for monogamous married  0.55  0.50  0.44  0.48  0.52  0.38  0.47  
Dummy for polygamous married  0.16  0.14  0.04  0.20  0.15  0.15  0.13  
Dummy for free union 0.02  0.02  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  
Dummy for single 0.21  0.29  0.38  0.28  0.25  0.40  0.28  
Dummy for divorced  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.06  
Dummy for widowed  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04  
Dummy for Christian 0.81  0.42  0.45  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.52  
Dummy for Muslim 0.10  0.57  0.43  0.96  0.97  0.93  0.11  
Dummy for other religion 0.09  0.01  0.12  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.37  
Completed years of education 5.92 5.14 4.47 5.10 5.30 5.21 4.13 5.16 4.80 5.52 4.75 4.90 6.09 4.59 
Dummy for no schooling  0.55  0.62  0.57  0.67  0.65  0.67  0.48  
Dummy for primary certificate (CEP)  0.22  0.18  0.20  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.30  
Dummy for middle school cert. (BEPC)  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.12  
Dummy for occupational proficiency 
certificate (CAP)  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  
Dummy for vocational certificate (BEP)  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.01  
Dummy for baccalauréat (BAC)  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.02  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Samples of Paid-Work Participants (Contd.) 
 
 
 
Cotonou  
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey 
(Niger) 
Dakar  
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
Observations 
(individuals with positive earnings) 4398 4211 4262 4032 3601 5434 3916 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dummy for two years of higher 
education (DEUG/DUT/BTS) 0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
Dummy for over two years of higher 
ed. 0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.03  
Potential experience in years  
(age-education-6) 23.99 12.50 24.50 13.82 22.04 11.50 24.88 13.14 26.18 14.35 24.26 13.35 21.82 12.16 
Seniority in the current job in years 8.13 8.34 6.68 7.48 6.32 6.73 8.04 8.20 8.71 8.61 9.96 8.23 6.12 7.32 
Dummy for father executive or manager 0.12  0.06  0.10  0.12  0.08  0.09  0.10  
Dummy for father wage-employee 0.16  0.15  0.16  0.11  0.13  0.22  0.19  
Dummy for father self-employed 0.48  0.53  0.56  0.55  0.53  0.39  0.50  
Dummy for father with no schooling 0.52  0.79  0.65  0.64  0.79  0.44  0.45  
Dummy for father with 1-5 years of ed. 0.21  0.07  0.19  0.14  0.07  0.03  0.21  
Dummy for father with 6-9 years of ed. 0.15  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.16  
Dummy for father with 10-25 y. of ed. 0.13  0.05  0.07  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.12  
Dummy for household head 0.51  0.44  0.49  0.43  0.54  0.29  0.52  
Dummy for head’s spouse 0.28  0.26  0.18  0.28  0.20  0.14  0.23  
Dummy for head’s child 0.12  0.17  0.10  0.14  0.16  0.28  0.12  
Dummy for head’s parent 
(father/mother) 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  
Dummy for head’s other parent  0.07  0.11  0.16  0.09  0.08  0.24  0.10  
Dummy for head’s not parent person  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  
Dummy for head’s domestic 0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.02  
Inverse dependency ratio (working 
indiv. / indiv. in the household) 1.41 1.33 1.03 0.88 1.28 1.13 0.93 0.85 0.94 1.04 1.09 1.13 1.39 1.05 
Dummy for working in the public 
sector 0.10  0.15  0.08  0.11  0.18  0.09  0.09  
Dummy for working in the formal 
private sector 0.12  0.08  0.21  0.11  0.13  0.18  0.08  
Dummy for working in the informal 
sector 0.78  0.77  0.72  0.78  0.69  0.73  0.83  
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, Phase 1 (Employment), 2001-2002, National Institutes of Statistics, AFRISTAT, DIAL; authors’ calculations. The figures are weighted by the sampling ratio of the surveys. 
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Table 4:  Selectivity Corrected Earnings Functions (all Sectors) 
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings 
 
 Cotonou (Benin) Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) Niamey (Niger) Dakar (Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
0.043*** 0.071*** 0.011 0.022** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.020* Completed years of education (5.47) (8.19) (1.45) (2.39) (4.54) (5.40) (1.94) 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** (Completed years of education)2 (5.59) (6.34) (10.65) (6.83) (6.02) (4.93) (6.66) 
0.013** 0.045*** 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.030*** Potential experience  
(age – years of education – 6) (2.42) (8.54) (5.10) (7.40) (6.64) (9.70) (5.19) 
-0.009 -0.052*** -0.019** -0.053*** -0.031*** -0.048*** -0.034*** (Potential experience)2/100 (1.05) (6.89) (2.33) (6.05) (4.92) (7.64) (4.12) 
0.024*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.032*** Seniority in current job (4.90) (5.85) (4.60) (5.66) (6.13) (6.52) (5.43) 
-0.041*** -0.038*** -0.066*** -0.042*** -0.054*** -0.043*** -0.056*** (Seniority in current job) 2/100 (2.66) (2.61) (3.02) (2.69) (3.15) (3.63) (3.01) 
-0.449*** -0.422*** -0.387*** -0.481*** -0.289*** -0.337*** -0.350*** Woman (16.75) (12.11) (12.79) (14.94) (8.06) (12.39) (9.96) 
0.382*** 0.659*** 0.687*** 0.267*** 0.454*** 0.468*** 0.618*** Public sector (8.93) (15.88) (14.48) (5.69) (10.56) (11.72) (9.24) 
0.242*** 0.625*** 0.485*** 0.236*** 0.426*** 0.423*** 0.429*** Formal private sector (6.39) (14.19) (14.36) (4.07) (8.79) (11.54) (6.76) 
Selection correction        
-0.153*** -0.052 -0.141*** 0.149*** 0.027 0.011 -0.045 Inverse Mills ratio (2.77) (1.30) (3.41) (2.94) (0.52) (0.27) (0.77) 
-2.196*** -3.186*** -2.194*** -2.636*** -2.810*** -2.554*** -2.962*** Constant (23.61) (35.65) (21.69) (23.93) (27.58) (26.70) (26.09) 
Observations 4182 3663 4011 4011 3817 3068 3491 
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.54 0.50 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.37 
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migratory status (dummies for rural, urban or foreign migrants), marital status (dummies for single, monogamous married, polygamous married, 
widowed, free union, divorced) and dummies for religion (Muslim, Christian). The inverse Mills ratio is derived from a probit estimation of labour market participation for each city (with, as dependent 
variable, a dummy variable of strictly positive income) comprising age and its squared, gender, years of education, migratory status, marital status, religion and two identifying variables namely how the 
individual is related to the head of household and the dependency ratio. The Student statistics are given in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped and robust to heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate 
respectively that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The reference category is a male working in the informal sector. 
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Figure 2: Predicted Earnings Based on Results in Table 4 
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Table 5: Selectivity Corrected Earnings Functions, with Crossed Effects of Generation 
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings 
 
Cotonou  
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey  
(Niger) 
Dakar  
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
 
X X*OLD X X*OLD X X*OLD X X*OLD X X*OLD X X*OLD X X*OLD 
               
               
-0.181  1.337***  -0.281  0.559*  -0.100  0.735***  -0.307  OLD (above 30 years 
old) (0.61)  (5.90)  (1.31)  (1.96)  (0.39)  (3.43)  (1.20)  
0.061*** -0.022 0.053*** 0.028 -0.014 0.048*** 0.010 0.021 0.045** 0.005 0.071*** -0.037** -0.003 0.040 Completed years of 
education (4.55) (1.25) (3.70) (1.47) (1.22) (2.65) (0.72) (1.16) (2.42) (0.26) (5.46) (2.10) (0.14) (1.62) 
0.002** 0.001 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.004*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.006*** -0.002 (Completed years of 
education)2 (2.06) (0.70) (6.46) (4.42) (9.67) (3.31) (5.89) (2.77) (3.60) (0.84) (2.17) (0.68) (5.22) (1.50) 
-0.002 0.024 0.084*** -0.074*** 0.024 0.007 0.041** -0.019 0.034 0.009 0.067*** -0.041* 0.044*** -0.013 Potential experience  (0.09) (0.89) (4.35) (3.55) (1.33) (0.36) (1.98) (0.86) (1.26) (0.35) (3.14) (1.88) (2.88) (0.75) 
0.074 -0.093 -0.118* 0.107 0.007 -0.028 0.017 -0.045 -0.032 -0.014 -0.078 0.047 -0.082 0.050 (Potential 
experience)2/100 (0.89) (1.13) (1.77) (1.61) (0.12) (0.46) (0.30) (0.78) (0.32) (0.14) (1.10) (0.67) (1.46) (0.88) 
0.011 0.018 0.057*** -0.033** 0.045*** -0.021 0.071*** -0.044** 0.028* 0.002 0.028 -0.000 0.045*** -0.009 Seniority in current 
job (0.70) (1.17) (4.54) (2.40) (2.79) (1.28) (4.43) (2.45) (1.77) (0.12) (1.44) (0.01) (3.59) (0.63) 
-0.026 -0.029 -0.159** 0.135* -0.097 0.045 -0.427*** 0.392*** 0.042 -0.089 -0.012 -0.026 -0.249*** 0.185* (Seniority)2/100 (0.23) (0.26) (2.08) (1.75) (0.66) (0.31) (3.20) (2.93) (0.34) (0.70) (0.12) (0.26) (2.60) (1.96) 
-0.414*** -0.056 -0.253*** -0.291*** -0.406*** 0.027 -0.381*** -0.172*** -0.299*** -0.006 -0.306*** -0.048 -0.344*** -0.006 Woman (9.64) (0.87) (5.45) (5.21) (10.57) (0.48) (7.46) (2.91) (4.20) (0.08) (7.44) (1.08) (7.92) (0.09) 
0.243** 0.164 0.561*** 0.127* 0.494*** 0.252** 0.402*** -0.128 0.506*** -0.057 0.613*** -0.158 0.618*** -0.009 Public sector (2.38) (1.56) (9.57) (1.80) (5.95) (2.39) (3.41) (0.96) (6.27) (0.60) (7.01) (1.51) (4.98) (0.07) 
0.207*** 0.054 0.591*** 0.018 0.459*** 0.048 0.114 0.165 0.282*** 0.214** 0.443*** -0.034 0.351*** 0.102 Formal private sector (3.22) (0.75) (11.81) (0.23) (9.99) (0.76) (1.23) (1.47) (4.04) (2.15) (7.64) (0.43) (4.33) (0.92) 
Selection correction               
-0.163***  -0.026  -0.130***  0.164***  0.040  0.034  -0.069  Inverse Mills ratio (3.11)  (0.53)  (3.20)  (3.40)  (0.75)  (0.81)  (1.41)  
-2.177***  -3.807***  -2.164***  -2.835***  -2.895***  -2.963***  -2.865***  Constant -0.163***  -0.026  -0.130***  0.164***  0.040  0.034  -0.069  
Joint F-test of nullity 
of education 
coefficients  
(value) 
2.04 27.6*** 15.6*** 14.6*** 1.05 11.8*** 3.1 
Observations 4184 3665 4010 3821 3065 4364 3495 
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.55 0.51 0.37 0.45 0.41 0.38 
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migratory status, marital status, two dummy variables for religion and their crossed age effects. The inverse Mills ratio is derived from a probit estimation of labour 
market participation for each city (described at the bottom of Table 4). The Student statistics are given in parenthesis. Standard errors are bootstrapped and robust to heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate respectively 
that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
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Table 6: Selectivity Corrected Earnings Functions in the Public Sector 
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings 
 
 Cotonou 
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey 
(Niger) 
Dakar 
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Total completed years of education 0.057* 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.051** 0.073*** 0.045** 0.065 
 (1.82) (6.97) (3.77) (2.02) (3.62) (2.08) (1.27) 
(Completed years of education)2 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.003 
 (2.18) (1.09) (0.67) (1.81) (2.07) (2.31) (1.58) 
Potential experience 0.046*** 0.054*** 0.020 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.032*** 0.037* 
 (2.74) (5.99) (1.38) (4.38) (5.82) (4.02) (1.70) 
(Potential experience)2/100 -0.029 -0.056*** 0.014 -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.020 -0.031 
 (0.88) (3.03) (0.40) (2.85) (4.33) (1.35) (0.76) 
Woman -0.082 -0.036 0.014 -0.081 -0.068 -0.139** 0.088 
 (0.86) (0.50) (0.25) (1.19) (1.00) (2.05) (0.92) 
Selection correction        
Inverse Mills ratio -0.234** 0.034 0.212*** -0.037 -0.008 0.087 -0.113 
 (2.38) (0.48) (3.28) (0.68) (0.19) (1.23) (0.84) 
Constant -2.105*** -2.738*** -2.377*** -2.434*** -2.579*** -1.907*** -2.493*** 
 (7.07) (15.95) (9.68) (12.04) (13.71) (9.62) (6.10) 
Observations 411 595 306 459 597 483 313 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.53 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.43 
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migratory status, marital status and two dummy variables for religion. The inverse Mills ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector choices (with, as 
reference category, non-paid work participation) comprising age and its squared, gender, years of education, migratory status, marital status, religion and two identifying variables namely how the individual is related to the 
head of household and the dependency ratio. The Student statistics are given in parenthesis. The standard errors are bootstrapped and robust to heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate respectively that the coefficient is 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 7: Selectivity Corrected Earnings Functions in the Formal Private Sector 
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings 
 
 Cotonou 
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey 
(Niger) 
Dakar 
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Total completed years of education -0.016 -0.024 -0.007 -0.013 0.125*** 0.028 0.004 
 (0.60) (0.58) (0.33) (0.48) (3.08) (1.31) (0.09) 
(Completed years of education)2 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.007*** 
 (4.45) (4.53) (8.51) (3.44) (0.61) (4.11) (3.72) 
Potential experience 0.001 0.008 0.039** 0.011 0.044* 0.035*** 0.032* 
 (0.08) (0.35) (2.28) (0.71) (1.95) (2.93) (1.90) 
(Potential experience)2/100 0.038* 0.009 -0.026 0.016 -0.025 -0.029 -0.012 
 (1.85) (0.27) (0.96) (0.68) (0.72) (1.56) (0.40) 
Woman 0.011 0.020 -0.116 -0.137 -0.242** -0.166** 0.119 
 (0.19) (0.20) (1.62) (1.10) (1.97) (2.51) (0.94) 
Selection correction        
Inverse Mills ratio -0.233*** -0.461** -0.042 -0.251*** 0.086 -0.098 0.003 
 (2.86) (2.37) (0.33) (6.72) (0.40) (0.97) (0.08) 
Constant -1.038*** -0.903 -1.860*** -1.407*** -3.139*** -1.737*** -2.809*** 
 (2.64) (1.04) (3.06) (4.32) (3.96) (3.96) (7.80) 
Observations 529 346 854 455 414 957 307 
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.49 0.45 0.32 0.45 0.32 0.35 
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migratory status, marital status and two dummy variables for religion. The inverse Mills ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector choices (with, as 
reference category, non-paid work participation) comprising age and its squared, gender, years of education, migratory status, marital status, religion and two identifying variables namely how the individual is related to the 
head of household and the dependency ratio. The Student statistics are given in parenthesis. The standard errors are bootstrapped and robust to heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate respectively that the coefficient is 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 8: Selectivity Corrected Earnings functions in the Informal Private Sector 
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings 
 
 Cotonou 
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey 
(Niger) 
Dakar 
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Completed years of education 0.027*** 0.034** -0.009 0.023* 0.015 0.030*** 0.007 
 (2.77) (2.31) (0.85) (1.71) (0.89) (2.65) (0.51) 
(Completed years of education)2 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.005*** 
 (3.67) (5.28) (7.21) (3.39) (3.90) (2.45) (4.74) 
Potential experience 0.018*** 0.050*** 0.020*** 0.042*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 (3.49) (7.48) (3.18) (8.05) (4.81) (3.14) (6.37) 
(Potential experience)2/100 -0.014** -0.051*** -0.008 -0.044*** -0.024*** -0.031** -0.038*** 
 (2.05) (6.09) (0.85) (6.41) (2.79) (2.29) (4.12) 
Woman -0.580*** -0.567*** -0.421*** -0.553*** -0.381*** -0.256*** -0.451*** 
 (17.09) (14.27) (10.72) (12.61) (7.77) (4.30) (12.20) 
Selection correction        
Inverse Mills ratio -0.118*** -0.042*** -0.184*** -0.021 -0.012 -0.297*** -0.062*** 
 (3.22) (3.51) (7.37) (0.69) (0.59) (3.12) (4.37) 
Constant -1.820*** -2.978*** -1.600*** -2.289*** -2.519*** -1.572*** -2.707*** 
 (12.30) (20.95) (11.44) (18.23) (16.35) (4.78) (24.20) 
Observations 3250 2771 2859 2931 2233 3423 2930 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.21 
Note: The additional explanatory variables in the models are migratory status, marital status and two dummy variables for religion. The inverse Mills ratio is derived from a multinomial logit model of sector choices (with, as 
reference category, non-paid work participation) comprising age and its squared, gender, years of education, migratory status, marital status, religion and two identifying variables namely how the individual is related to the 
head of household and the dependency ratio. The Student statistics are given in parenthesis. The standard errors are bootstrapped and robust to heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate respectively that the coefficient is 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Figure 3: Marginal Returns to Education by Sector of Activity, Based on Results in Tables 6, 7 
and 8 
(calculated at the sample mean) 
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Table 9: Overview of the Marginal Returns to Education by Sector and Cohort 
(computed at the sample mean) 
 
 
Cotonou 
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte d’Ivoire)
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey 
(Niger) 
Dakar 
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
Public sector        
Young 0.103 0.149 0.173 0.102 0.103 0.105 0.080 
 61 135 36 59 107 77 48 
Old 0.134 0.110 0.126 0.101 0.120 0.098 0.158 
 350 460 270 400 489 406 265 
Total 0.130 0.119 0.132 0.101 0.117 0.099 0.146 
 411 595 306 459 596 483 313 
Test of difference young-old 0.70 2.66 1.08 1.61 1.25 0.45 3.14 
Formal private sector        
Young 0.030 -0.043 0.092 0.080 0.127 0.049 0.081 
 164 124 325 130 150 339 97 
Old 0.084 0.032 0.119 0.066 0.133 0.084 0.159 
 365 222 529 325 264 618 210 
Total 0.068 0.005 0.109 0.070 0.131 0.072 0.134 
 529 346 854 455 414 957 307 
Test of difference young-old 3.57 5.53* 2.39 2.00 0.63 4.53* 2.50 
Informal sector        
Young 0.066 0.103 0.032 0.045 0.070 0.069 0.067 
 1 458 1295 1496 1365 831 1664 1428 
Old 0.049 0.057 0.044 0.047 0.028 0.037 0.060 
 1792 1476 1362 1566 1398 1759 1501 
Total 0.057 0.078 0.038 0.046 0.044 0.052 0.063 
 3250 2771 2858 2931 2229 3423 2929 
Test of difference young-old 4.27 8.86** 5.16** 4.35 2.00 5.49** 4.76* 
*, ** and *** indicate respectively significant difference at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The number of corresponding observations is in italic.  
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Table 10: Marginal Returns to Education Using Alternative Estimation Techniques 
(computed at the sample mean) 
 
   
Cotonou 
(Benin) 
Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) 
Abidjan 
(Côte 
d’Ivoire) 
Bamako 
(Mali) 
Niamey 
(Niger) 
Dakar 
(Senegal) 
Lome 
(Togo) 
                  
Public sector    
OLS 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.130*** 0.089*** 0.119*** 0.104*** 0.119*** 
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.044** 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.081*** 0.117*** 0.130*** 0.111*** 
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.048** 0.093*** 0.096*** 0.075*** 0.118*** 0.129*** 0.110*** 
Selectivity corrected + Control Function (CF) 0.064* 0.093*** 0.102*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 0.151*** 0.122* 
Selectivity corrected + CF + HFE 0.119 0.060 0.022 0.155 0.075 0.302 0.122 
Observations 289 433 238 341 351 371 209 
Formal private sector        
OLS 0.117*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.112*** 0.141*** 0.092*** 0.149*** 
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.087*** 0.143*** 0.068*** 0.163*** 
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.144*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 0.080*** 0.142*** 0.072*** 0.178*** 
Selectivity corrected + Control Function (CF) 0.153** 0.173*** 0.113*** 0.147*** 0.137*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 
Selectivity corrected + CF + HFE -0.028 -0.025 0.102 0.347 0.034 0.020 -0.210 
Observations 351 246 616 294 240 775 216 
Informal sector        
OLS 0.064*** 0.074*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.073*** 0.066*** 
Selectivity corrected (Lee’s method) 0.072*** 0.056*** 0.032*** 0.055*** 0.010 0.068*** 0.064*** 
Selectivity corrected + father’s characteristics 0.066*** 0.048*** 0.033*** 0.051*** 0.004 0.064*** 0.063*** 
Selectivity corrected + Control Function (CF) 0.092*** 0.075*** 0.017*** 0.074*** 0.037 0.104*** 0.089*** 
Selectivity corrected + CF + HFE 0.054** 0.075 0.054 0.069*** 0.090 0.097*** 0.069*** 
Observations 2298 2162 2171 2273 1513 2993 2154 
Note: HFE for Household Fixed Effects. The earnings models are performed on restricted samples including at least two active occupied individuals in each household. They include the same set of characteristics as 
those of Table 6, 7 and 8. The standard errors are bootstrapped and robust to clustering. *, ** and *** indicate respectively education coefficients jointly significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
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Figure 4: Marginal Returns to Qualifications in the Public Sector 
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Figure 5: Marginal Returns to Qualifications in the Formal Private Sector 
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Figure 6: Marginal Returns to Qualifications in the Informal Private Sector 
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Figure 7: Returns to the Vocational Certificate (BEP*) Across Sectors 
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*BEP: Brevet d’Études Professionnelles 
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